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INTRODUCTION 
n February 2006, a political maelstrom broke out in Washington, 
D.C., over the recent acquisition of six major United States ports by 
Dubai Ports World (DP World).1 The Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS or the Committee) had 
approved the sale of the ports to DP World, a United Arab Emirates-
based company controlled by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al 
Maktoum, the Emir of Dubai.2 Despite clearing this crucial regulatory 
hurdle, the DP World deal was quickly met with a barrage of political 
opposition; with September 11, 2001, still fresh in lawmakers’ minds, 
many feared that putting a Middle Eastern company in charge of U.S. 
critical infrastructure would increase the risk of another terrorist attack 
on American soil.3 Although DP World soon abandoned its takeover 
of these ports, the political fight over CFIUS and its regulatory 
authority was only beginning.4 
 
1 Key Questions About the Dubai Port Deal, CNN (Mar. 6, 2006, 8:15 PM), http://www 
.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/03/06/dubai.ports.qa/index.html?_s=PM:POLITICS. These 
ports included terminals in New York City, Philadelphia, and New Orleans, amongst other 
major hubs. Id. 
2 Randall Beisecker, DP World and U.S. Port Security, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE 
(Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/dp-world-and-us-port-security/; see 
also Julio J. Rotemberg, The Dubai Ports World Debacle and Its Aftermath, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Aug. 29, 2007, at 2–5, https://hbr.org/product/dubai-ports-world-debacle-and-its          
-aftermath/707014-PDF-ENG (detailing DP World’s ownership structure). 
3 See Jonathan Masters, Foreign Investment and U.S. National Security, COUNCIL ON 
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In the aftermath of the DP World controversy, Congress amended 
the CFIUS process by passing the Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act of 2007 (FINSA).5 Originally established in 1950, CFIUS 
scrutinizes foreign acquisitions that take place in the United States 
through the lens of national security; in particular, CFIUS reviews 
international transactions that lead to the acquisition of American 
assets for potential national security threats.6 Foreign companies and 
individuals do not have unfettered access to the American market; 
rather, they must be reviewed and approved by CFIUS.7 As then-House 
Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank noted during the 2007 
hearings on amendments to the CFIUS process, “[t]here is no right to 
buy. You do not have to file [with CFIUS], but by not filing, you do 
not immunize yourself from a finding that the transaction could be 
canceled on security grounds.”8 
Despite the ensuing legislative action and Representative Frank’s 
comments, a considerable amount of ambiguity remained surrounding 
the Committee’s authority to cancel foreign transactions.9 Under what 
circumstances may CFIUS terminate or rescind a foreign purchase?10 
What kinds of procedural protections are due to foreign entities during 
the course of a CFIUS national security review?11 
For the most part, these questions went unanswered by the federal 
judiciary.12 In 2012, however, CFIUS found itself in the judicial 
spotlight, when the Obama administration blocked the sale of four 
Oregon wind farms to a Chinese company, Ralls Corp. (Ralls).13 Ralls 
subsequently filed suit in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia, arguing that CFIUS’s actions violated Ralls’ procedural due 
 
5 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–49, 121 Stat. 
246 (2007); see also Masters, supra note 3 (discussing how the DP World Controversy 
sparked CFIUS reform). 
6 Masters, supra note 3. 
7 Id. 
8 Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), One Year After Dubai 
Ports World: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 26 (2007) (statement 
of Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.). 
9 Lauren Bateman, Foreign Purchases of U.S. Businesses, Presidential Power, and 
National Security: Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS, LAWFARE (Apr. 11, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www 
.lawfareblog.com/2014/04/foreign-purchases-of-u-s-businesses-presidential-power-and        
-national-security-ralls-corp-v-cfius/. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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process rights, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act.14 The 
district court initially dismissed Ralls’ due process claim, holding that 
(1) Ralls had failed to state a protected property interest under the Due 
Process Clause, and (2) even if Ralls had been deprived of a protected 
property interest, Ralls received sufficient process through the 
Committee review process.15 Ralls appealed and, in a move that 
surprised many legal observers and commentators, the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed in July 2014.16 Unlike the district 
court, the D.C. Circuit held that, not only had Ralls stated a protected 
interest under the Due Process Clause, but Ralls was in fact denied due 
process during its CFIUS review.17 Subsequently, the district court 
ordered CFIUS to turn over its unclassified evidence and gave Ralls an 
opportunity to challenge both the unclassified documents as well as 
assertions of executive privilege made with regard to classified 
evidence.18 In November 2014, for the first time in the Committee’s 
 
14 Id. Because this Note solely focuses on Ralls’ claim as it relates to procedural due 
process and, in particular, the amount of deference courts owe the executive on matters of 
national security, this Note will not address Ralls’ claim under the Administrative Procedure 
Act. 
15 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S. (Ralls I), 987 F. Supp. 2d 18, 32 
(D.D.C. 2013). 
16 See, e.g., Christine E. Savage et al., Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States: Court of Appeals’ Decision May Change How CFIUS Conducts 
National Security Reviews, KING & SPALDING 1 (July 18, 2014), http://www.kslaw 
.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca071814b.pdf (characterizing the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision as “unprecedented and surprising”); Ralls v. CFIUS: D.C. Circuit 
Explains Constitutional Due Process Requirements During CFIUS Review, SULLIVAN & 
CROMWELL LLP 4 (July 17, 2014), http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC 
_Publication_Ralls_v_CFIUS_DC_Circuit_Explains_Constitutional_Due_Process_Re 
quirements.pdf (“In light of the substantial deference that courts usually afford to the 
Executive Branch on national security matters, as well as the lack of comparable litigation 
historically, Ralls is a surprising decision.”); Raffaela Wakeman, Bringing More Due 
Process to CFIUS: An Overview of the D.C. Circuit’s Opinion in Ralls, LAWFARE (July 17, 
2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/07/bringing-more-due-process-to-cfius 
-an-overview-of-the-d-c-circuits-opinion-in-ralls/ (remarking that the D.C. Circuit’s 
reversal “came as quite a surprise”). This surprise was not limited to the American legal 
community, but was also reported in the media. See William Mauldin & Brent Kendall, 
Appeals Court Faults Government Order Prohibiting Ralls Corp. Wind Farm Deal, WALL 
ST. J. (July 15, 2014, 7:46 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/appeals-court-faults-govern 
ment-order-prohibiting-ralls-corp-wind-farm-deal-1405439077 (describing the appellate 
court’s opinion as “an unprecedented legal victory over the White House”). 
17 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S. (Ralls II), 758 F.3d 296, 316, 319 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
18 Brandon Lowrey, Chinese-Owned Co. Set to Fight US Bar to Wind-Farm Deal, 
LAW360 (Nov. 6, 2014, 9:08 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/594280/chinese-owned 
-co-set-to-fight-us-bar-to-wind-farm-deal. 
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history, CFIUS submitted close to thirty-five hundred pages of 
documents to Ralls from its review of the wind farm purchase.19 
This Note explores the implications that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion 
in Ralls II will have on (1) traditional conceptions of due process, (2) 
judicial deference to the executive branch on issues of national 
security, (3) national security as it relates to future disclosure of 
sensitive information, and (4) the attractiveness of the United States to 
foreign investors. Part I introduces CFIUS’s history and purpose, and 
details the 2007 changes to the Committee’s authority under FINSA. 
Part II surveys the relevant factual history in Ralls. Part III traces the 
holding and rationale of both the district court’s decision in Ralls I and 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Ralls II. Finally, Part IV analyzes the Ralls 
II decision and argues that the D.C. Circuit took an improper view of 
the kinds of procedural protections required in a CFIUS assessment. 
Part IV also contends that, as a result of the D.C. Circuit’s 
misapplication of the Fifth Amendment, the Ralls II decision is 
simultaneously overbroad and overly narrow: it unnecessarily 
undermines the President’s powers as Commander in Chief and 
jeopardizes American national security, yet will likely fail to make 
CFIUS more transparent. Part IV concludes by proposing an 
independent Article III court, modeled after the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, which could review CFIUS’s national security 
decisions. 
I 
BACKGROUND: HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. CFIUS’s Purpose 
CFIUS was created to balance the need for foreign investment in 
American industry with the potential security concerns that accompany 
foreign control of U.S. companies. Generally speaking, domestically 
owned companies and foreign-owned companies are perceived 
differently in the United States; while U.S.-based entities are presumed 
to be credible and trustworthy, foreign corporations are met with 
suspicion and caution.20 For example, a foreign company could be 
 
19 Karlee Weinmann, In Rare Move, CFIUS Hands Over Cache of Ralls Docs, LAW360 
(Nov. 26, 2014, 1:16 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/599760. 
20 ALAN P. LARSON & DAVID M. MARCHICK, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CSR 
NO. 18, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY: GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT 
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influenced by the government of a country that is hostile to the United 
States. In such a scenario, a foreign power could use the stealth 
acquisition of an American company to undermine strategic U.S. 
interests.21 In other instances, like the one at play in the DP World 
scandal, a company might work alongside law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies and thus have access to classified or sensitive 
information.22 Pentagon contractors, for example, have access to a 
wealth of classified information, and it is important that companies 
with sensitive military contracts handle such information with 
discretion.23 Additionally, under the Patriot Act,24 the U.S. Department 
of Justice relies on telecommunications firms to wiretap and gather 
bulk collection data from emails and phone calls.25 Similarly, the 
intelligence gathered by these kinds of intercepts should be closely 
guarded and not be disclosed or leaked to a foreign government.26 
Although many countries also review international transactions that 
involve sensitive information or technologies,27 the United States, in 
particular, has been increasingly skeptical of foreign investment 
because—due to globalization—traditional American adversaries can 
now both directly and indirectly invest in U.S. companies and strategic 
assets.28 As noted by international investment experts Alan Larson and 
David Marchick, “many of the companies from China and the Middle 
East are government owned and, in some cases, government controlled. 
The majority of publicly traded Chinese companies . . . continue to be 
government-owned and -controlled . . . . [even if they are] nominally 
private . . . .”29 Accordingly, even if the vast majority of foreign 
ownership in U.S. firms is benign, concerns can become particularly 
 
9 (2006) (“Rightly or wrongly, there is a perception in some parts of the U.S. government 
that American-owned and -controlled companies are more likely to abide by the spirit of 
U.S. government laws, regulations, and policies.”). 
21 See id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 10. 
24 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections 
of 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 42, 47, 49, 50 U.S.C.). 
25 LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 10. 
26 Id. 
27 Masters, supra note 3 (Restrictions imposed on foreign investment by U.S. lawmakers 
mirror actions by “their peers around the globe . . . . In recent years, many nations have 
reassessed their [foreign investment] laws in light of fears associated with international 
terrorism and global investments by state-owned enterprises . . . and sovereign wealth funds 
. . . .”). 
28 See LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 20. 
29 Id. at 21. 
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acute where “the foreign company’s decisions become an extension of 
the government’s policy decisions rather than the company’s 
commercial interests.”30 As a result, U.S. lawmakers are particularly 
suspicious of sensitive acquisitions that can be traced back to a foreign 
government that does not share U.S. strategic interests. CFIUS, then, 
fills this crucial regulatory role—to monitor the foreign acquisition of 
American firms and to ensure that such transactions are in line with 
U.S. national security interests. 
B. CFIUS’s Structure and Authority 
CFIUS was established pursuant to section 721 of the Defense 
Production Act of 1950 (DPA).31 The DPA gives the Committee and 
the President authority over “covered transaction[s],” which are 
defined as “any merger, acquisition, or takeover . . . by or with any 
foreign person which could result in foreign control of any person 
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.”32 The 
Committee is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and is composed 
of other cabinet-level appointees and high-level officials, all of whom 
have portfolios that include foreign policy, national security, and the 
economy.33 
Congress considerably expanded CFIUS’s authority in 1988 under 
what was colloquially known as the “Exon-Florio” Amendment.34 
 
30 Id. Larson and Marchick cite Gazprom’s 2006 decision to cut off natural gas supplies 
to Ukraine as a cautionary example. Id. For many Western observers, the Ukraine shut off 
was an indication of the way in which Gazprom manipulates the global supply of energy in 
order to further Russia’s foreign policy goals rather than the company’s own financial 
interests. See id. 
31 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2013). 
32 Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(a)(3) (West 
2012) (previously codified at 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 2170(a)(3) (West)). 
33 Id. § 4565(k)(2)–(3). In addition to the Treasury Secretary, the Committee includes the 
Secretaries of Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, State, and Energy; the United States 
Attorney General; the Secretary of Labor and the Director of National Intelligence, who act 
as nonvoting, ex officio members; and other appropriate officials appointed by the President. 
Id. § 4565(k)(2). The United States Trade Representative and the Director of the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy have been presidentially appointed to CFIUS, and five other 
officials have been designated to participate in CFIUS activities as observers by the 
President. Exec. Order No. 13,456 §§ 3(b)–(c), 73 Fed. Reg. 4677, 4677 (Jan. 23, 2008). 
These observers include the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security Advisor, the 
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Id. at § 3(c). 
34 Jonathan C. Stagg, Note, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional 
Involvement is Too Much?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 335 (2007). Throughout this Note, the 
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Exon-Florio’s passage was prompted by the Fujitsu Corporation’s 
attempted takeover of the Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation.35 
American officials, fueled in part by Tokyo’s increased dominance on 
the international stage, were concerned that a Japanese acquisition of 
Fairchild would threaten not only the competitiveness of the U.S. 
semiconductor industry, but also American national security more 
broadly.36 Alarmed that existing foreign investment laws did not give 
the President the authority to block such acquisitions without declaring 
a national emergency, the Reagan administration pushed Congress to 
pass a law that would allow the White House to effectively veto foreign 
transactions that potentially jeopardized national security.37 Congress 
soon acquiesced with the passage of Exon-Florio.38 
Exon-Florio significantly widened the President’s authority to 
review foreign transactions by giving the executive considerable 
discretion to block such acquisitions.39 As noted by Jonathan Stagg, 
“Congress’s purpose in enacting Exon-Florio was . . . to provide a 
mechanism to review and, if the President finds it necessary, restrict 
foreign investment when it threatens national security.”40 No longer 
restricted to his emergency powers, the provision authorized the 
President to suspend or prohibit a foreign acquisition if he determines 
that such an action is appropriate in light of national security concerns, 
subsequent to an investigation known as a CFIUS national security 
review.41 Exon-Florio set up a four-part process for examining foreign 
transactions, which was later amended in 2007.42 
 
laws granting authority to CFIUS are interchangeably referred to as the Defense Production 
Act or Exon-Florio. 
35 Id. 
36 LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 4. 
37 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUB. NO. RS22197, THE EXON-FLORIO 
NATIONAL SECURITY TEST FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 3–4 (2006), https://www.fas.org 
/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22197.pdf; see also Stagg, supra note 34, at 335. 
38 Stagg, supra note 34, at 335. 
39 Marc Greidinger, The Exon-Florio Amendment: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 6 
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 118 (1991). 
40 Stagg, supra note 34, at 336. 
41 JACKSON, supra note 37, at 2–3; Stagg, supra note 34, at 336. 
42 H.R. REP. NO. 110-24, pt. 1, at 10 (2007) (Conf. Rep.). These four steps are: 
(1) voluntary notice by the companies; (2) a 30-day review to identify any national 
security concerns; (3) an optional 45-day investigation to determine whether 
identified concerns require more extensive mitigation efforts or a recommendation 
to the President for possible action; and (4) a Presidential decision to permit, 
suspend, or prohibit an acquisition in those instances where potential national 
security concerns are identified. 
Id. 
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A CFIUS national security review is initiated in one of two ways. 
First, any party to a covered transaction may initiate a review by 
submitting a written notice to the Treasury Secretary.43 A party may 
send this notice either before or after the transaction is completed.44 
Alternatively, the Committee may unilaterally initiate a review of any 
covered transaction.45 Although CFIUS filings are strictly voluntary, 
companies have multiple incentives to file on their own. First, the 
Treasury Department and other federal agencies have historically 
encouraged foreign companies “to seek approval whenever they have 
reason to believe that the acquisition might raise national security 
issues.”46 Second, CFIUS provides a carrot to foreign companies by 
immunizing transactions that receive the Committee’s approval from 
future scrutiny.47 Finally, the Committee’s authority to review and 
order divesture of a transaction at any time, including after the deal has 
been completed, acts as a stick to encourage voluntary review.48 
A CFIUS national security review evaluates a transaction’s effects 
on national security through eleven factors which are set out in the 
Exon-Florio Amendment.49 If CFIUS determines that a transaction 
 
43 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(i) (West 2012) (previously codified at 50 App. U.S.C.A. 
§ 2170 (West)). 
44 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(a) (2015) (“A party . . . to a proposed or completed transaction 
may file a voluntary notice of the transaction with the Committee.” (emphasis added)). 
45 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(b)(1)(D)(i). 
46 LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 11. 
47 Id. If parties engage in misrepresentation during the initial CFIUS review process, 
however, they do not receive this “safe harbor.” Id.; see also 50 U.S.C.A. § 
4565(b)(1)(D)(ii)–(iii). 
48 LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 11. 
49 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(f). These factors include: 
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements[;] (2) 
the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense 
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technology, 
materials, and other supplies and services[;] (3) the control of domestic industries 
and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity 
of the United States to meet the requirements of national security[;] (4) the 
potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on sales of military goods, 
equipment, or technology to [certain] countr[ies] . . . [;] (5) the potential effects of 
the proposed or pending transaction on United States international technological 
leadership in areas affecting United States national security[;] (6) the potential 
national security-related effects on United States critical infrastructure, including 
major energy assets[;] (7) the potential national security-related effects on United 
States critical technologies[;] (8) whether the covered transaction is a foreign 
government-controlled transaction . . . [;] (9) as appropriate, and particularly with 
respect to transactions [which are unmitigated threats to U.S. national security; 
which are a foreign government-controlled transaction; or which would result in 
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poses an unmitigated threat to U.S. national security,50 the Committee 
must “immediately conduct an investigation of the effects of [the] 
transaction on . . . national security . . . and take any necessary actions 
in connection with the transaction to protect . . . national security.”51 
After completing its review, CFIUS must “send a report to the 
President requesting the President’s decision” if the Committee 
concludes that a transaction jeopardizes national security.52 Upon such 
a referral, the President is then authorized by the Exon-Florio 
Amendment to “take such action for such time as the President 
considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction 
that threatens to impair the national security of the United States.”53 
However, the President may only take such actions if he finds that (1) 
there is credible evidence that the foreign interest exercising control 
might take action that threatens to impair national security, and (2) 
other laws do not adequately allow the President to protect national 
security.54 When making his decision, the President evaluates a 
transaction’s potential national security threat through the same factors 
as the Committee.55 Notably, any findings made or actions taken by 
the President pursuant to the CFIUS review process are final and are 
statutorily excluded from judicial review.56 
C. CFIUS in a Post-9/11 World: Key FINSA Changes 
The DP World scandal prompted Congress to pass FINSA.57 As 
noted in the bill’s legislative history, the DP World debacle raised 
 
foreign control of U.S. critical infrastructure in a manner that poses an unmitigated 
threat to U.S. national security], a review of the current assessment of [the foreign 
country’s adherence to nonproliferation regimes and the foreign country’s 
relationship with the United States] [;] (10) the long-term projection of United 
States requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources and 
material[;] and (11) such other factors as the President or the Committee may 
determine to be appropriate, generally or in connection with a specific review or 
investigation. 
Id. 
50 Id. § 4565(b)(2)(B). 
51 Id. § 4565(b)(2)(A). 
52 31 C.F.R. § 800.506(b) (2015). 
53 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(d)(1). 
54 Id. § 4565(d)(4). 
55 Id. § 4565(d)(5); see also supra note 49 (listing factors). 
56 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(e) (“The actions of the President under paragraph (1) of subsection 
(d) and the findings of the President under paragraph (4) of subsection (d) shall not be 
subject to judicial review.” (emphases added)). 
57 H.R. REP. NO. 110-24, pt. 1, at 12–13 (2007) (Conf. Rep.). 
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Congressional concerns about the CFIUS review process; legislators 
were worried that the acquisition had received insufficient scrutiny 
from the Committee, that junior-level policymakers were making the 
final call on CFIUS decisions, and that Congress did not have sufficient 
oversight over CFIUS reviews.58 Congress was additionally concerned 
that CFIUS’s review standards were ambiguous, which led to 
unpredictable investigatory outcomes.59 
In response, Congress passed FINSA.60 FINSA expanded the 
CFIUS review process by increasing the rigor of the Committee’s 
national security investigations in five relevant ways.61 
First, FINSA clarified Exon-Florio’s national security concept to 
include transactions that center around critical infrastructure62 and 
technology.63 Thus, all transactions involving critical infrastructure 
and technology automatically trigger a full CFIUS review. Second, 
under FINSA, transactions involving corporations owned by foreign 
governments automatically trigger heightened CFIUS scrutiny.64 
Third, FINSA imposed a second, forty-five-day investigatory review 
for transactions that pose unmitigated threats to national security.65 
Fourth, FINSA added the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to 
the Committee as an ex officio member, instructing the DNI to 
independently coordinate and conduct CFIUS’s investigations of 
 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 13 (“Key concerns raised by the DPW case included . . . ambiguity in the 
standards by which CFIUS determines the need for second-stage investigations . . . . The 
Committee believes passage of [FINSA] will . . . return the certainty and predictability to 
the CFIUS process that legitimate foreign investors are seeking.”). 
60 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–49, 121 Stat. 
246 (2007). 
61 See Warren G. Lavey & Ivan A. Schlager, US Foreign Investment Act: Impact on 
Asian Companies, ASIALAW, Sept. 2007, at 24, https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files 
/publications/Publications1319_0.pdf. 
62 Pub. L. No. 110–49, § 2(a)(5) (“The term ‘national security’ shall be construed so as 
to include those issues relating to ‘homeland security’, including its application to critical 
infrastructure.”); Lavey & Schlager, supra note 61, at 24. Critical infrastructure, as defined 
in the statute, means “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating 
impact on national security.” Pub. L. No. 110–49, § 2 (a)(6). 
63 Pub. L. No. 110–49, § 2(a)(7) (“The term ‘critical technologies’ means critical 
technology, critical components, or critical technology items essential to national defense    
. . . .”); Lavey & Schlager, supra note 61, at 24. 
64 Pub. L. No. 110–49, § 2(b)(1)(B); see also Lavey & Schlager, supra note 61, at 24. 
65 Lavey & Schlager, supra note 61, at 26. 
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national security threats.66 Finally, FINSA added six factors that the 
Committee must consider when evaluating a transaction’s potential 
implications on national security.67 
In addition to boosting CFIUS’s rigor, FINSA also aimed to enhance 
CFIUS’s clarity and transparency.68 In large part, this was 
accomplished by reeling in the Committee’s independent authority and 
instead placing CFIUS’s review powers under the auspices of 
Congress. For example, FINSA was the first legislative codification of 
the Committee’s powers.69 More importantly, FINSA mandated that 
the Committee provide an annual report to Congress which details the 
types of transactions that CFIUS has reviewed.70 To an extent, this 
places CFIUS’s decisions in public view and thus gives companies 
notice of the factors the Committee evaluates when analyzing a specific 
transaction.71 FINSA also increased CFIUS’s transparency by 
requiring the Committee to publish guidance on the types of covered 
transactions that may pose threats to U.S. national security or critical 
infrastructure.72 
Thus, although FINSA continues to prohibit judicial review of 
CFIUS decisions, the 2007 legislation increased CFIUS’s transparency 
through Congressional oversight and mandatory public reporting; 
together, these moves raised foreign investors’ knowledge of the 
 
66 Pub. L. No. 110–49, § 2 (b)(4)(A) (“The Director of National Intelligence shall 
expeditiously carry out a thorough analysis of any threat to the national security of the 
United States posed by any covered transaction. The [DNI] shall also seek and incorporate 
the views of all affected or appropriate intelligence agencies with respect to the 
transaction.”); Margaret L. Merrill, Overcoming CFIUS Jitters: A Practical Guide for 
Understanding the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 30 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 1, 8 (2011). 
67 These factors are codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 4565(f)(6)–(11) (West 2012) (previously 
codified at 50 App. U.S.C. § 2170 (f)(6)–(11) (West)). See supra note 49. 
68 John J. Muldowney & Judith J. Sullivan, Recent Reforms to U.S. Foreign Investment 
Law: The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 and Final Regulations, 
WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources          
-alerts-102.html. 
69 Merrill, supra note 66, at 8. 
70 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(m)(1) (“The chairperson shall transmit a report to the chairman 
and ranking member of the committee of jurisdiction in the Senate and the House . . . before 
July 31 of each year on all of the reviews and investigations of covered transactions 
completed [pursuant to FINSA].”). 
71 Id. § 2170(m)(3)(B) (“All appropriate portions of the annual report . . . may be 
classified. An unclassified version of the report, as appropriate, . . . shall be made available 
to the public.” (emphasis added)); Merrill, supra note 66, at 14. 
72 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(b)(2)(E). 
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CFIUS review process.73 Despite this heightened transparency, 
however, the CFIUS debate came to a head almost seven years after 
FINSA’s passage, after a Chinese corporation attempted to purchase 
several wind farms in Oregon. 
II 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND IN RALLS 
In March 2012, Ralls Corp., a Delaware corporation owned by two 
Chinese nationals, purchased four American companies in order to 
develop wind energy in Oregon.74 These companies were originally 
created by an Oregon corporation with the purpose of constructing four 
wind farms (Butter Creek).75 Prior to Ralls’ acquisition, these 
companies had acquired numerous wind farm-related assets, including 
property easements, power purchase agreements, transmission 
agreements, and turbine construction permits.76 Ralls did not 
voluntarily notify CFIUS of the wind farm transaction.77 
The Butter Creek projects are located in and around a restricted 
airspace and bombing zone maintained by a nearby U.S. Navy 
installation.78 Ralls planned to install Chinese-made wind turbines at 
the projects.79 The Navy requested that Ralls move one of its project 
sites, which was in restricted airspace, in order to avoid conflicts with 
military training flights.80 Notably, other foreign-owned wind turbines 
are located near the secured area.81 Although Ralls moved the project 
site, the wind farm remained within the restricted airspace.82 
CFIUS quickly contacted Ralls and encouraged the company to file 
a voluntary notice under Exon-Florio, warning that a unilateral CFIUS 
 
73 See Maira Goes de Moraes Gavioli, National Security or Xenophobia: The Impact of 
the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (“FINSA”) in Foreign Investment in the 
U.S., 2 WM. MITCHELL L. RAZA J. 1, 23 (2011). 
74 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d 18, 21 (D.D.C. 2013). 
75 Ralls II, 758 F.3d 296, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Am. Compl. ¶ 5, Ralls Corp. v. 
Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 987 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:12-cv-01513)). 
76 Id. 
77 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 23. 
78 Ralls II, 758 F.3d at 304; Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 21. 
79 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 21. 
80 Ralls II, 758 F.3d at 304–05. 
81 Id. at 305. According to Ralls, there are “dozens if not hundreds” of such turbines both 
in and near the restricted airspace, and these turbines are both foreign-owned and foreign-
made. Id. (citing Am. Compl. ¶ 57). 
82 Id. at 304–05. 
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review would ensue if Ralls failed to file.83 Ralls filed a voluntary 
notice with the Treasury Department, arguing that its Butter Creek 
transaction posed no threat to U.S. national security.84 CFIUS initiated 
its national security review pursuant to the DPA, followed up with 
specific questions for Ralls, and received a presentation from Ralls.85 
After completing its initial review, CFIUS performed a full 
investigation of the Ralls transaction. CFIUS submitted a report to the 
President on September 13, 2012, and requested a presidential 
decision.86 Fifteen days later, the President issued an order finding 
credible evidence that Ralls’ acquisition of the Butter Creek projects 
posed an unmitigated threat that could impair U.S. national security.87 
Amongst other things, the Presidential Order (1) prohibited Ralls from 
owning any of the four wind farm companies, (2) directed Ralls to 
divest all its assets in the companies, (3) required that Ralls remove all 
structures or installations from the project sites, and (4) ordered Ralls 
to refrain from selling or transferring any interest in the companies.88 
Ralls did not receive notice from the Committee or the President on the 
relevant evidence used in their respective decisions, and Ralls also did 
not receive an opportunity to rebut that evidence.89 
Subsequently, Ralls filed a complaint against CFIUS which, at its 
core, alleged that Ralls did not receive adequate procedural due process 
during the Committee’s and the President’s review of the Butter Creek 
transaction.90 Specifically, Ralls contended that its Fifth Amendment 
rights were violated because it received neither a detailed explanation 
of the President’s decision, nor an opportunity to be heard.91 
 
83 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 24. 
84 See id. 
85 Ralls II, 758 F.3d at 305; Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 24. 
86 Ralls II, 758 F.3d at 305; see also Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (citing Am. Compl. ¶ 
90). 
87 Ralls II, 758 F.3d at 306; Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (citing Order Regarding the 
Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by Ralls Corp., Ex. 6 to Am. 
Compl. (“President’s Order”) [Dkt. # 20–6] at 1). 
88 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 24–25 (citing President’s Order at 1–3). 
89 Ralls II, 758 F.3d at 306. 
90 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 25. 
91 Id. 
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III 
HOLDINGS AND RATIONALES 
A. The District Court Decision 
Judge Amy Jackson, writing for the District Court for the District of 
Columbia, held that Ralls’ due process rights were not violated during 
the CFIUS national security review because Ralls failed to allege a 
protected property interest under the Fifth Amendment.92 
Alternatively, Judge Jackson determined that, even if Ralls had stated 
a cognizable property interest, the CFIUS review provided Ralls with 
adequate process.93 
1. Legally Protected Interests Under the Due Process Clause 
The district court initially focused on whether Ralls had stated a 
claim under the Due Process Clause.94 For the court, the crucial 
requirement was whether the plaintiff had pled “that the government 
[had] interfered with a cognizable liberty or property interest.”95 
Although the court acknowledged that, through the Butter Creek 
transaction, Ralls had acquired property rights under Oregon law, 
Judge Jackson noted that Ralls obtained these property interests 
“subject to the known risk of a Presidential veto.”96 Crucially, the court 
stressed that Ralls failed to file a pre-acquisition notice with the 
Committee, despite the incredibly strong incentives to do so.97 By 
failing to file a section 2170(b)(1)(C) notice, Ralls waived the ordinary 
due process protections that apply to a CFIUS review.98 Ralls would 
have received procedural protections consistent with the Fifth 
Amendment if it had filed a voluntary notice, yet it chose not to.99 
Essentially, by entering the transaction without the Committee’s 
preapproval, Ralls assumed the risk of having its state law property 
 
92 Id. at 21, 32. 
93 Id. at 37. 
94 Id. at 26. 
95 Id. (quoting Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 479–80 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam)) (quotation marks omitted). 
96 Id. at 26–27. These property rights included the holding companies, easements, 
agreements with an Oregon utility, and turbine construction permits. See supra note 76 and 
accompanying text. 
97 Id. at 27–28; see also supra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
98 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 27–29. 
99 Id. at 29–30. 
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rights revoked by the President.100 Thus, Ralls could not state a due 
process claim based on those very state law rights.101 
The court also rejected Ralls’ argument that CFIUS’s actions 
deprived the company of an expectation interest under Board of 
Regents v. Roth.102 In Roth, the Supreme Court recognized property 
rights and interests that go beyond traditional concepts of ownership; 
if a person has “a legitimate claim of entitlement” to a benefit, then 
they have a property interest in that benefit.103 Roth further recognized 
that property rights “are not created by the Constitution,” but rather 
have their roots in both state law and common law.104 Accordingly, 
because Ralls had acquired property rights under Oregon law when it 
completed the Butter Creek transaction, Ralls’ counsel contended that 
the company had a Roth-based reliance interest in the wind farms; 
Ralls’ state property rights created an expectation of due process.105 
By purchasing the Butter Creek site, Ralls contended that it had a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to the properties, triggering the Fifth 
Amendment’s procedural protections as well as the safeguards 
embedded in the DPA.106 
The court rejected Ralls’ expectation interest argument for two 
reasons. First, the court noted that Exon-Florio does not create an 
entitlement or benefit for foreign companies; rather, “it simply 
authorizes the President to stop a transaction from going forward.”107 
Second, because Exon-Florio vests expansive, non-reviewable 
authority in the President to cancel a foreign acquisition, foreign 
companies do not have a Roth-like expectation interest.108 The 
 
100 Id. at 27 (“Ralls . . . voluntarily acquired those state property rights subject to the 
known risk of a Presidential veto. . . . Ralls’s claim cannot be squared with the fact that Ralls 
waived the opportunity . . . to obtain a determination from CFIUS and the President before 
it entered into the transaction.”). 
101 Id. at 28–29 (citing Parker v. Bd. of Regents of Tulsa Junior College, 981 F.2d 1159, 
1163 (10th Cir. 1992); Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
102 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 31–32; Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
103 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; see also Joel Hugenberger, Note, Redefining Property Under 
the Due Process Clause: Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales and the Demise of the Positive 
Law Approach, 47 B.C. L. REV. 773, 782 (2006). 
104 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (“Property interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. 
Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings 
that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure 
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”). 
105 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 29. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 30. 
108 Id. at 30–31. 
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President has the final discretion to approve or deny a CFIUS 
application, and Exon-Florio does not constrain the President to a 
particular process, limit the factors which the President can consider, 
or guarantee a particular outcome.109 Accordingly, foreign companies 
like Ralls do not have an expectation interest in U.S.-based 
international acquisitions; the statute instead “puts foreign-owned 
companies on notice that they do not have an entitlement to engage in 
mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers in the United States: they are 
subject to Presidential review.”110 
2. Sufficiency of Process 
After concluding that Ralls had waived its due process rights, the 
court went on to evaluate the amount of process that the company 
received during its CFIUS review.111 The court held that, even 
assuming that Ralls was entitled to the protections of the Fifth 
Amendment, Ralls received sufficient process from the Committee and 
the President.112 Classically, as designated by the Court in Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, due process requires notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.113 The court began by stressing the flexible, 
context-specific nature of the Due Process Clause’s procedural 
protections.114 The court broke Ralls’ claim into two components: the 
alleged lack of notice and rebuttal opportunity, and the President’s 
refusal to provide Ralls with the evidence on which he made his 
decision.115 Under the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge116 balancing 
test—which weighs the private interest that will be affected by official 
action, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest as well as the 
probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the 
government’s interest117—the district court concluded that Ralls was 
not denied due process in either regard.118 
 
109 Id. at 30–32. 
110 Id. at 30. 
111 Id. at 32. 
112 Id. 
113 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). 
114 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 492 
(1972)). 
115 Id. 
116 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
117 Id. at 335. 
118 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 32. 
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First, Judge Jackson noted that Ralls received notice from the 
Committee and that Ralls had the opportunity to be heard.119 For the 
district court, Ralls received notice insofar as the Committee expressly 
notified Ralls that the transaction was subject to CFIUS review, 
recommended that Ralls file a voluntary notice with the Committee, 
and informed Ralls that a unilateral review would ensue if Ralls did not 
file a voluntary notice.120 Additionally, Ralls received an opportunity 
to be heard insofar as the company filed a notice with CFIUS in which 
it contended that the Butter Creek projects did not threaten national 
security, responded to follow-up questions from the Committee, and 
gave a presentation to the Committee on the benign nature of the wind 
farms.121 Thus, the court concluded that Ralls received the Loudermill 
requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
Turning to the Mathews test, the court determined that the factors 
“weigh[ed] overwhelmingly in favor of the government.”122 For the 
court, the government’s interest in protecting national security 
considerably outweighed any property interest that Ralls might have 
had in the four Oregon companies.123 Moreover, to the extent that Ralls 
sought disclosure of the evidence on which the President and the 
Committee based their decisions, the executive branch has a valid 
national security interest in withholding information about a specific 
national security threat from the group that it believes poses that 
threat.124 Finally, because the President retains complete discretion to 
block a foreign transaction, the court found that the probable value of 
additional protections, including evidentiary disclosure, would be 
minimal.125 As a result, the Mathews balancing test favored CFIUS and 
the President.126 
Next, the court more directly addressed Ralls’ claim that the 
President was required to disclose the reasons for his decision.127 





122 Id. at 33. 
123 Id. (“Even if the Court were to find that Ralls was deprived of some kind of property 
interest, that property interest is relatively weak in the face of the strong governmental 
interest in protecting the national security.”). 
124 Id. at 34 (citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State (Mojahedin), 
182 F.3d 17, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
125 Id. at 34–35. 
126 Id. at 37. 
127 Id. at 35. 
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Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which 
authorizes the Secretary of State to formally designate an organization 
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).128 Under these cases, the 
Secretary of State may only designate an organization as an FTO after 
considering three public record findings, as well as the classified and 
unclassified information that suggests that an organization threatens 
national security.129 
The court distinguished Ralls from the AEDPA decisions in three 
ways. First, the court noted that AEDPA decisions, unlike those under 
Exon-Florio, are subject to judicial review.130 Second, the court 
stressed that even the AEDPA cases do not mandate disclosure of 
evidence related to national security findings; although People’s 
Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States Department of State 
and other cases require due process procedures for the Secretary of 
State’s public record findings, they do not force the government to turn 
over any evidence—classified or not—that the Secretary relied upon in 
determining a group’s threat to national security.131 
Third, Judge Jackson pointed out that, unlike the AEDPA cases, 
public dissemination of the government’s nonclassified evidence was 
not inevitable in Ralls.132 In National Council of Resistance of Iran v. 
Department of State (NCRI),133 the D.C. Circuit held that the 
government did not have a strong interest in the nondisclosure of 
unclassified evidence when that evidence was ultimately going to be 
made public anyway.134 By contrast, the circuit court held that 
disclosure was not required where the evidence was outside of the 
public purview and concerned national security.135 For the district 
court, the situation in Ralls was largely analogous to the latter context, 
where the government’s evidence was unlikely to ever seep into the 
 
128 Id. For the full text of the AEDPA, see 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012). 
129 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (summarizing Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 23). 
130 Id. at 36; see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(c)(1) (“[T]he designated organization may seek 
judicial review . . . .”). 
131 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 35–36 (summarizing cases). 
132 Id. at 36–37. 
133 Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (NCRI), 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). 
134 Id. at 208–09. 
135 Id. (“The notice must include the action sought, but need not disclose the classified 
information . . . . This is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive, and we do 
not intent to compel a breach in the security which that branch is charged to protect.”). 
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public domain.136 Accordingly, the AEDPA cases did not require the 
executive branch to inform Ralls of the specific grounds for its 
decision, and the district court held that Ralls had been afforded 
adequate due process during the CFIUS review process.137 
B. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision 
In July 2014, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court decision. 
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson held 
that Ralls was denied due process during its CFIUS review because (1) 
Ralls was never advised of the national security concerns stemming 
from its wind farms, and (2) Ralls was not allowed to view or rebut the 
government’s national security evidence.138 
1. Legally Protected Property Interests Under the Due Process 
Clause 
Like the district court, the D.C. Circuit began its analysis by looking 
at the extent to which the CFIUS review process implicated a 
constitutionally-protected property interest owned by Ralls.139 In a 
departure from the trial court’s reasoning, Judge Henderson concluded 
that Ralls had alleged a protected property interest under the Fifth 
Amendment.140 The circuit court noted that property interests are 
usually protected by the Constitution if they fall within state law 
property rights.141 Disagreeing with the district court, the D.C. Circuit 
held that Ralls’ property rights were not sufficiently contingent as to 
bar protection under the Fifth Amendment.142 
Unlike the district court, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that, 
because Ralls acquired the Butter Creek properties subject to the 
known risks of a CFIUS review, Ralls did not have a vested property 
interest in its wind farms.143 For the circuit court, Ralls’ state property 
rights fully vested upon the completion of the Butter Creek transaction 
and these state rights were in no way affected by the mere potential of 
later federal action.144 Even though Ralls faced the possibility of a 
 
136 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 36–37. 
137 See id. at 37. 
138 See Ralls II, 758 F.3d 296, 301, 320–21 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
139 Id. at 315. 
140 Id. at 319. 
141 Id. at 315–16. 
142 Id. at 316. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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presidential veto, this risk did not disassemble Ralls’ bundle of 
rights.145 
Moreover, according to the D.C. Circuit, Ralls did not waive its 
property interest in the Butter Creek properties by failing to petition 
CFIUS for preacquisition approval.146 Although the court conceded 
that Ralls failed to initiate a CFIUS review on its own, Judge 
Henderson concluded that this waiver was not relevant when 
determining whether a property interest is at stake; at most, such a 
waiver only helps determine the amount of process that a party is 
entitled to receive.147 Furthermore, for the D.C. Circuit, Ralls’ failure 
to engage in CFIUS’s preapproval process only begged the question of 
whether that preapproval process was constitutionally adequate—
parties do not waive due process claims by forgoing constitutionally 
inadequate procedures.148 Finally, because CFIUS allows parties to 
initiate a national security review either before or after a transaction is 
completed, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Ralls did not waive its due 
process rights by failing to seek preapproval.149 
2. Sufficiency of Process 
Because the circuit court concluded that Ralls had not waived its due 
process rights, it went on to analyze whether CFIUS had provided the 
company with adequate procedural protections.150 Drawing heavily on 
cases from the FTO-designation context, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
Committee had provided Ralls with insufficient process under the Fifth 
Amendment.151 For Judge Henderson and her colleagues, Ralls was 
entitled to receive notice of its CFIUS review, owed access to the 
unclassified evidence which supported the Committee’s decision, and 
entitled to rebut the Committee’s unclassified evidence.152 
The D.C. Circuit began its sufficiency of process analysis by noting 
that due process requires both the right to know the factual basis for a 
 
145 See id. 
146 Id. at 317. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 317 n.18. 
149 Id. at 317. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 318–19. 
152 Id. 
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decision, as well as the opportunity to rebut the relevant evidence.153 
Notably, although the court cited the Mathews balancing test, it 
declined to expressly go through an analysis of the balancing 
factors.154 Instead, the court analogized the CFIUS review process to 
the FTO-designation procedure under AEDPA, which requires the 
Secretary of State to notify an organization of its designation as an 
FTO, disclose unclassified evidence to the organization, and allow the 
organization to rebut such unclassified evidence.155 The court noted 
that both CFIUS and FTO reviews affect a party’s property interests; 
FTO reviews are prohibited from accessing American bank accounts, 
just as foreign corporations are barred from accessing assets involved 
in a covered transaction.156 
The court extended its FTO analysis to the CFIUS context. In NCRI 
and its line of cases, the D.C. Circuit concluded that an FTO-designee 
could not be deprived of a property interest without receiving notice of 
the proposed designation, access to supporting unclassified evidence, 
and the opportunity to rebut that unclassified evidence.157 Importantly, 
FTO-designees are entitled to these protections despite the 
government’s compelling national security interests, and despite the 
low probability that an FTO-designee could successfully rebut the State 
Department’s evidence.158 The D.C. Circuit stressed, however, that 
companies undergoing a CFIUS review are entitled only to see the 
Committee’s unclassified evidence; due process does not require the 
disclosure of classified documents.159 
The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the district court’s analysis of the 
AEDPA cases. First, the D.C. Circuit read the AEDPA cases—and 
 
153 Id. at 318 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); Gray Panthers v. 
Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
154 Id. at 317–18; see also Amy S. Josselyn, National Security at All Costs: Why the 
CFIUS Review Process May Have Overreached Its Purpose, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1347, 
1377 (2014). 
155 Ralls II, 758 F.3d at 318 (citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State 
(Mojahedin III), 613 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chai v. Dep’t of State, 466 F.3d 125 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006); NCRI, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
156 Id. at 318. 
157 Id. (citing NCRI, 251 F.3d at 201, 208–09). 
158 Id. at 318–19 (parenthetically quoting NCRI, 251 F.3d at 207, 209 (“We have no 
reason to presume that the petitioners . . . could have offered evidence which might have       
. . . changed the Secretary’s mind . . . . However, without the due process protections which 
we have outlined, we cannot presume the contrary either.”)). 
159 Id. at 319 (parenthetically quoting NCRI, 251 F.3d at 209–10 (“classified [documents 
and] information [are] ‘within the privilege and prerogative of the executive, and we do not 
intend to compel a breach in the security which that branch is charged to protect’”)). 
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NCRI in particular—to affirmatively require the disclosure of 
unclassified evidence under the Due Process Clause.160 Thus, for Judge 
Henderson, due process requires the disclosure of unclassified 
evidence, regardless of whether public dissemination of that evidence 
is inevitable.161 Second, the appellate panel noted the similar “dearth” 
of statutory procedural protections under both AEDPA and Exon-
Florio.162 Because both laws afforded aggrieved parties with minimal 
process, both should be extended additional protections by the Fifth 
Amendment.163 
For these reasons, the D.C. Circuit concluded that “the Presidential 
Order deprived Ralls of its constitutionally protected property interests 
without due process of law.”164 The court held that due process 
requires, at a minimum, that an affected party (1) be informed of 
CFIUS’s action, (2) be given access to the unclassified evidence on 
which CFIUS relied, and (3) be allowed to rebut CFIUS’s unclassified 
evidence.165 The D.C. Circuit disputed the district court’s claim that 
Ralls had received sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard.166 
The district court had emphasized that CFIUS had expressly notified 
Ralls that its transaction was subject to a national security review, 
accepted a filing from Ralls in which the company argued that the 
Butter Creek projects did not impair U.S. national security, and 
received a presentation from Ralls on the nature of the company’s 
Butter Creek activities.167 Nonetheless, for the D.C. Circuit, this 
process fell short of the Fifth Amendment’s standard.168 Although 
Ralls was aware of the CFIUS proceeding and was able to submit 
evidence to the Committee, this process was insufficient because Ralls 
was unable to either tailor its evidence to the government’s concerns or 
rebut the government’s arguments.169 Importantly, even though the 
government has a significant national security interest in the CFIUS 
 




164 Id. at 319. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Ralls I, 987 F. Supp. 2d 18, 32 (D.D.C. 2013). 
168 Ralls II, 758 F.3d at 319. 
169 Id. at 319–20. 
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process, this interest only extends to the dissemination of classified 
evidence.170 
For the D.C. Circuit, the potential national security implications of 
evidentiary disclosure are cabined by limiting such disclosure to 
unclassified documents. The President is not required to “disclose his 
thinking on sensitive questions related to national security” in 
reviewing a CFIUS transaction, but must only turn over nonsensitive 
documents at some point before issuing a presidential order.171 
Because CFIUS acts on behalf of the President when reviewing foreign 
transactions, CFIUS itself can provide a party with adequate process at 
the Committee review stage of the process.172 Here, because Ralls did 
not receive the government’s unclassified evidence or the opportunity 
to rebut such evidence at any point before the President ordered the 
company to divest its holdings, the CFIUS review process violated the 
Due Process Clause.173 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit reversed the 
opinion of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to 
ensure that Ralls received adequate procedural due process.174 
IV 
IMPLICATIONS 
Although the D.C. Circuit’s attempt to increase the amount of 
CFIUS-related due process is laudable, the Ralls II decision raises two 
interrelated problems. First, by ducking the Mathews balancing test, the 
D.C. Circuit misapplied the controlling law on procedural due process. 
In particular, the D.C. Circuit’s approach—which, in all circumstances, 
requires notice, the presentation of unclassified evidence, and an 
opportunity for the opposing side to rebut the government—failed to 
take into account the context-specific nature of due process analysis. 
Second, and relatedly, by mandating minimum procedural 
requirements regardless of the magnitude of a specific national security 
threat, the Ralls II decision undercuts the President’s Article II war 
powers in a manner that could potentially jeopardize U.S. strategic 
interests. To be clear, the heightened procedural requirements have 
their benefits: they likely increase the transparency of the CFIUS 
review process in a way that will attract additional international 
 
170 Id. at 320. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 320–21. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 325. 
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investment in the United States. However, these benefits could also be 
achieved without sacrificing judicial deference to the executive on 
issues of national security, and without endangering American strategic 
assets. For example, a separate Article III court modeled after the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) could review classified 
CFIUS material and tailor procedural protections on a case-by-case 
basis. 
A. What Process Is Due?: The D.C. Circuit’s Misapplication of 
Mathews v. Eldridge 
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Ralls II is a notable departure from 
traditional due process analysis. Rather than apply the standard three-
part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the court analogized 
Ralls II to a series of FTO-designation cases.175 Although the circuit 
court paid lip service to the Mathews test, it did not analyze the Ralls 
facts in light of the private interests affected by CFIUS’s decision; the 
risk that the CFIUS procedures erroneously deprived Ralls of its 
private interests, as well as the added value of heightened safeguards; 
and the government’s interest in deeming the Butter Creek project a 
national security threat. Instead, the D.C. Circuit inappropriately 
borrowed its due process analysis from another case—NCRI176—
devoid of any of the CFIUS- or Ralls-specific context.177 
The D.C. Circuit’s failure to apply the Mathews test to the Ralls facts 
is perplexing, particularly because the Ralls II opinion emphasized the 
contextual and fact-specific nature of the due process inquiry.178 
Although due process generally requires notice and a hearing, the 
precise form and substance of these obligations can vary widely based 
on the particulars of a given case.179 Accordingly, in a due process 
analysis, courts typically interrogate a case’s evidence, categorize that 
evidence into one of the three Mathews factors, and then delicately 
balance those factors against each other.180 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, for 
 
175 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
176 NCRI, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
177 See Ralls II, 758 F.3d at 318–20. 
178 See id. at 317 (“Unlike some legal rules, due process is not a technical conception 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. To the contrary, due process 
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
179 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976). 
180 E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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example, the Supreme Court noted that an enemy combatant detained 
at Guantanamo Bay had a substantial interest in being free from 
physical detention, that the government had a sizable interest in 
preventing an enemy combatant from returning to the battlefield, and 
that there was a considerable risk of error if an enemy combatant was 
not given a hearing before a neutral decision maker.181 Thus, as Hamdi 
illustrates, the Mathews test is contingent on express facts in an 
individual case. 
This fact-specific inquiry shapes the amount of procedural 
safeguards that are constitutionally required in a particular 
circumstance. Again, Hamdi is instructive. Rather than grant enemy 
combatants blanket access to notice and a hearing, the Supreme Court 
tailored the amount of due process to the exigencies of the situation.182 
Thus, in light of the government’s robust national security concerns, 
the Court allowed the executive to give detainees in the War on Terror 
a relaxed form of procedural due process, wherein hearsay is 
admissible and the defendant bears the burden of proof.183 As Hamdi 
demonstrates, the Fifth Amendment’s protections are not stationary, 
but can vary widely based on individual circumstances. 
In Ralls II, the court of appeals engaged in none of the fact-specific 
inquiries that are the hallmarks of due process. To the contrary, the 
D.C. Circuit asserted that NCRI was controlling precedent, and 
required the government to give CFIUS reviewees an identical level of 
process as is required of the State Department when it designates a 
group as an FTO.184 This analogical extension of the NCRI analysis, 
however, improperly conflates administrative similarity with factual 
congruence, and thus erodes the Fifth Amendment’s timeworn 
standard. Instead, the D.C. Circuit should have emulated the district 
court’s due process analysis, applying the Mathews balancing factors 
to the Ralls facts.185 Although the Mathews analysis does not dictate 
that the D.C. Circuit reach the same conclusion as the D.C. District 
Court, the D.C. Circuit, at a minimum, should have scrutinized the facts 
within the Mathews framework. 
Moreover, even if it was appropriate to shoehorn NCRI’s analysis 
into an unrelated case, the factual differences between Ralls and NCRI 
make this kind of analogical extension impossible. Unlike Ralls, the 
 
181 Id. at 528–33. 
182 Id. at 533–34. 
183 Id. 
184 See Ralls II, 758 F.3d at 318–19. 
185 See supra notes 112–26 and accompanying text. 
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State Department’s interpretation of AEDPA only provided for post-
deprivation relief.186 For the NCRI court, the temporal aspect of due 
process was crucial; although strong government interests like national 
security can justify relaxing the due process standard, such interests do 
not warrant providing a party with post-deprivation relief instead of 
pre-deprivation relief.187 As a result, the court held in NCRI that the 
State Department must provide all necessary due process before 
depriving a party of a property interest.188 By contrast, in Ralls, CFIUS 
provided Ralls with pre-deprivation notification of an impending 
national security review, asked Ralls questions prior to any property 
deprivation, and received a presentation from Ralls on the Butter Creek 
transaction before rescinding the transaction.189 Thus, because CFIUS 
provided Ralls with pre-deprivation safeguards, the D.C. Circuit’s 
analogy to NCRI was flawed. 
B. Ralls II: Simultaneously Overly Broad and Overly Narrow 
From a policy perspective, the D.C. Circuit’s approach in Ralls II is 
at once both overly broad and overly narrow. First, it is too broad in the 
sense that it overreaches onto what are customarily executive branch 
prerogatives in a way that potentially jeopardizes U.S. national 
security. In this way, Ralls II severely undercuts both the President’s 
inherent authority as Commander in Chief, as well as American 
strategic interests at-large. Second, it is too narrow because its 
protections will likely be rendered meaningless in the real world. 
Although the D.C. Circuit’s opinion could theoretically increase 
CFIUS’s transparency and encourage foreign investment in the United 
States, the routine over-classification of national security evidence will 
stymie any efforts to give CFIUS applicants meaningful notice. Thus, 
Ralls II’s procedural safeguards are unsatisfactory to both sides of 
CFIUS review. 
1. Disrupting the Balance: Ralls II’s Impact on Judicial Deference 
Ralls II casts a constitutional shadow far beyond Mathews. In 
addition to straying from the traditional framework for procedural due 
 
186 NCRI, 251 F.3d 192, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
187 See id. (stating that although the government’s strong national security interest affects 
“the ‘what’ of the due process . . . . [i]t is not . . . apparent how [national security] affects 
the ‘when’ of the process”). 
188 Id. at 208. 
189 See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text. 
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process, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion also upsets the balance of executive 
and judicial war powers. By divorcing the government’s interest in 
national security from the context of specific threats, the D.C. Circuit 
superseded the President’s threat calculations with its own, 
manufactured legal reasoning. Accordingly, Ralls II disrupts the 
separation of powers and signals a substantial departure from the 
judiciary’s typical deferential posture on issues of national security. 
Courts rarely intrude on the President’s authority to protect national 
security, particularly where, as in Exon-Florio, Congress has expressly 
delegated such decision making to the executive branch.190 This 
deference stems from the President’s inherent and plenary powers 
under Article II, as well as his authority as Commander in Chief.191 
Thus, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Supreme 
Court held that the President is the “sole organ” of the government in 
international affairs and must be afforded a considerable amount of 
“discretion and freedom” when conducting the nation’s foreign 
relations.192 Accordingly, courts are hesitant to second-guess executive 
decisions on issues of national security; as the Court noted in Egan, 
“courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority 
of the executive in military and national security affairs.”193 In 
particular, judicial deference to presidential decision-making is 
especially strong where “Congress has authorized the President to 
protect the nation’s security.”194 
Judicial deference to the President on national security matters is 
appropriate because the executive branch has more national security 
competence than the judiciary, and because the President is more 
democratically accountable than judges.195 From an institutional 
competency perspective, the executive is better-suited to make national 
security decisions because unitary and decisive actions are more 
 
190 See Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
& Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1101–02 (2008) 
(finding that courts defer to the executive 78.5% of the time when a statute implicates 
national security, and 100% of the time when super-deference to executive national security 
interpretations is invoked). 
191 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936). 
192 Id. at 320. 
193 Egan, 484 U.S. at 530. 
194 Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2664 
(2005) (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)). 
195 See Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive 
Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 882–83 (2013) 
(surveying academic literature on national security deference). 
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effective, because the executive has heightened expertise, and because 
the executive has the ability to act quickly and in secret.196 The 
judiciary, by contrast, does not have access to the kinds of information 
needed to evaluate national security arguments.197 Moreover, judges 
lack political accountability to make difficult national security 
decisions.198 Unlike unelected judges, voters can voice their 
displeasure at the polls when a president makes a specific policy 
choice.199 As a result of these advantages, national security 
determinations are best left to executive branch officials, not judges. 
Although the DPA does not bar judicial review of constitutional 
claims related to CFIUS,200 Ralls II is considerably less deferential to 
the executive than other national security-related decisions. Without 
regard to either the CFIUS context or the specific national security 
threat determined by the President, the Ralls II decision manufactured 
a baseline of procedural protections for all CFIUS reviewees. If the 
court had deferred to and evaluated the government’s interest in Ralls, 
the D.C. Circuit could have developed a personalized procedural 
standard for the Butter Creek projects. Instead, the court of appeals 
refused to take the executive at its word that the Oregon windfarms 
jeopardized national security, and imposed the kind of one-size-fits-all 
test that Mathews specifically disowns. By requiring the President to 
turn over all nonclassified materials that informed a CFIUS decision, 
the D.C. Circuit created a mechanism through which foreign 
companies can second-guess the President’s national security 
decisions. Correspondingly, Ralls II restrained the President’s ability 
to swiftly and decisively shut down foreign transactions that imperil 
U.S. interests. Because courts traditionally afford substantial deference 






198 Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (Military 
and foreign policy judgments “are and should be undertaken only by those directly 
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a 
kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long 
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or 
inquiry.”). 
199 Deeks, supra note 195, at 883. 
200 See Ralls II, 758 F.3d 296, 307–12 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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2. Unknown Unknowns: Ralls II’s Destabilizing Effect on U.S. 
Strategic Interests 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion is also overbroad in the sense that it could 
jeopardize American strategic interests. Although several 
commentators have praised CFIUS reform as a way to bolster foreign 
investment in the United States,201 Ralls II could potentially embolden 
U.S. adversaries to use foreign business ventures as a cover for military 
espionage. The D.C. Circuit opinion will encourage both legitimate and 
subversive foreign investment, all while weakening CFIUS’s ability to 
identify national security red flags. 
Ralls II potentially makes it easier for foreign governments to use 
shell companies to spy on U.S. military secrets. Since 2008, numerous 
Chinese investment projects near U.S. defense installations have been 
scuttled due to counterintelligence concerns.202 Among other 
examples, in 2009, the White House forced a Chinese mining company 
to withdraw its CFIUS application for the acquisition of a Nevada mine 
near a naval base.203 In encouraging the mining company to pull out of 
the transaction, the Obama administration cited the potential national 
security consequences of having Chinese-owned assets near sensitive 
military facilities, as well as concerns that that the mine would be a 
boon to Chinese missile development.204 Similarly, in 2012, a second 
Chinese company voluntarily divested its assets in another U.S. mining 
operation after CFIUS pointed to regulatory alarms arising from the 
mine’s proximity to a U.S. Naval Air Station.205 Both of these 
decisions were motivated by continuing “espionage concerns related to 
 
201 See infra notes 206–09 and accompanying text. 
202 Thilo Hanemann & Daniel Rosen, Ralls v. CFIUS: What Are the Implications for 
Chinese Investment?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 5, 2012), http://blogs.cfr 
.org/renewing-america/2012/10/05/ralls-vs-cfius-what-are-the-implications-for-chinese        
-investment/. 
203 Benjamin A. Powell, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 
Concerns Cause Parties to Abandon Transaction, WILMERHALE LLP (July 7, 2010), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=90034 
#4; see also Eric Lipton, Questions on Security Mar Foreign Investments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/business/18invest.html?_r=0. 
204 Stephanie Kirchgaessner, White House Scuppers Emcore Deal Over National 
Security Fear, FIN. TIMES (June 30, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/76196 
da2-83dd-11df-ba07-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3UVg0tT1t; Lipton, supra note 203. 
205 Form 8-K, HK Battery Tech. Inc., Current Report, to U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 
(June 11, 2012), http://www.getfilings.com/sec-filings/120615/Nevada-Gold-Holdings-Inc 
_8-K/. 
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geographic proximity of [Chinese investment] assets to defense 
installations.”206 
After Ralls II, foreign companies are less likely to voluntarily cancel 
an American acquisition because of CFIUS concerns.207 Instead, with 
guaranteed procedural protections in hand, these corporations will be 
more likely to challenge the Committee’s national security 
determinations and force a presidential veto.208 Ralls II’s increased 
transparency will attract both genuine foreign investment opportunities 
as well as Trojan horses, which will make CFIUS’s screening role more 
difficult. In particular, U.S. adversaries will have an incentive to 
swamp the Committee with applications because, by requiring the 
disclosure of unclassified evidence, Ralls II raises the risk of 
involuntary disclosure of U.S. intelligence operations.209 In essence, 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion will open the floodgates to all types of 
foreign investment, while watering down the executive branch’s ability 
to monitor such transactions for national security threats. 
3. Over-Classification: Ralls II’s Impact on Foreign Investment 
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion is also overly narrow because its 
procedural protections are unlikely to provide parties with notice and a 
hearing in a meaningful way. Several commentators have been quick 
to applaud the Ralls II decision as a way to increase CFIUS’s 
transparency, thus bolstering foreign investment in the United 
States.210 Despite the 2007 FINSA reforms, many believe that 
CFIUS’s opaqueness has continued to deter international investment 
and chill foreign trade.211 Because foreign companies and their legal 
 
206 Hanemann & Rosen, supra note 202. 
207 See Stewart Baker & Stephen Heifetz, Ralls May Give Foreign Investors More 
Leverage with CFIUS, LAW360 (Dec. 11, 2014, 11:21 AM), http://www.law360.com 
/articles/603312/ralls-may-give-foreign-investors-more-leverage-with-cfius (arguing that 
Ralls II will bolster investors’ bargaining position with CFIUS and incentivize foreign 
companies to hold out for due process review). 
208 Id. 
209 See THEODORE H. MORAN, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., US GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE REGULATIONS FOR IT COMPANY NETWORKS: TOWARD A GLOBAL 
FRAMEWORK 11 (Dec. 2014), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/US-govern 
ment-surveillance-regulations-for-IT-company-networks.pdf. 
210 See generally Josselyn, supra note 154, at 1368–70 (surveying literature regarding 
CFIUS’s negative impact on foreign trade). 
211 See, e.g., LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 17–18 (documenting how foreign 
countries have erected barriers to U.S. trade as a result of CFIUS-related backlash); James 
F.F. Carroll, Comment, Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National 
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advisors are largely unaware of the specific factors that CFIUS uses to 
evaluate international transactions, CFIUS can create investor 
uncertainty.212 Such ambiguity discourages investors from acquiring 
assets in the United States.213 In recent years, the uncertainty 
surrounding the American investment climate has likely increased as a 
result of the Obama administration’s more active use of CFIUS to 
block or hinder specific foreign acquisitions. 
As a counter to decades of impenetrable U.S. trade policy, the Ralls 
II decision could potentially boost CFIUS’s transparency by providing 
a clear procedural standard for review.214 Foreign investors, long 
deterred by CFIUS’s vague national security language, could be 
buoyed by the prospect of reviewing some of the Committee’s evidence 
and the opportunity to rebut the executive branch. Lawyers who 
specialize in cross-border transactions and who are repeat players in 
front of the Committee, for example, could study upcoming CFIUS 
decisions, decipher CFIUS’s orders, and make predictions about how 
the Committee will view a particular transaction’s national security 
consequences. In this way, by establishing minimum procedural 
protections, Ralls II could demystify the CFIUS review process, reduce 
regulatory uncertainty, and spur future foreign investment. 
Despite its supporters, however, Ralls II’s implications on 
international trade are likely to be minimal. First, as a result of FINSA’s 
annual reporting requirements, CFIUS’s transparency is at a historic 
high.215 Second, because the D.C. Circuit only required the 
government to turn over its unclassified evidence, the executive branch 
will likely systematically over-classify all of its CFIUS evidence. 
Rather than risk turning over potential state secrets, CFIUS could 
instead mark all of its national security evidence as classified in order 
to keep it out of adversarial hands.216 Although CFIUS applicants 
would receive notice and a hearing, they could not adequately rebut 
evidence that they are not allowed to see. Over-classification would 
 
Security Act’s Conception of National Security, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 167, 187–88 
(2009) (arguing that CFIUS’s vague national security mandate has led to a chilling effect on 
international investment). 
212 Carroll, supra note 211, at 188. 
213 Id. 
214 Josselyn, supra note 154, at 1378. 
215 See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text. 
216 For a general discussion of the way the U.S. national security community responds to 
potential embarrassments through over-classification, see Erin M. Stilp, Comment, The 
Military and State-Secrets Privilege: The Quietly Expanding Power, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 
831, 842–45 (2006). 
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essentially render Ralls II’s safeguards meaningless. Thus, somewhat 
ironically, the Ralls II decision has the potential to increase the amount 
of secrecy surrounding CFIUS. Third, even if the executive branch 
does not alter the classification of its CFIUS documents, the required 
disclosure of unclassified evidence is unlikely to lead to many practical 
protections for companies like Ralls. Sensitive information that lies at 
the heart of CFIUS’s threat determinations will remain classified and 
away from the eyes of foreign investors and their attorneys. Finally, to 
the extent that parties ask for relevant national security evidence, the 
government could simply claim that such documents are covered by 
executive privilege.217 For these reasons, although Ralls II 
theoretically could incentivize foreign trade by providing additional 
safeguards to investors, its real world effect on CFIUS transparency is 
likely to be minimal. 
C. Due Process in a Dangerous World: Special Article III Courts as a 
Solution to the CFIUS Quandary 
Simply put, traditional Article III courts are the improper forum to 
review national security decisions of CFIUS’s magnitude. As argued 
above, this kind of judicial oversight is unlikely to lead to concrete 
improvements in CFIUS’s transparency, but will undermine the 
executive branch’s constitutional authority to make national security 
decisions. There is, however, a way forward. Rather than subject the 
United States to unnecessary security risks, Congress should create a 
specialized Article III court that can oversee the CFIUS review process. 
Modeled after the FISC, the CFIUS court could independently review 
classified national security evidence and tailor procedural safeguards 
to the intricacies of a specific foreign transaction.218 In this way, the 
CFIUS court could defer to the national security determinations of the 
President, while still providing foreign investors with the requisite 
amount of due process. 
 
217 In Ralls II, the D.C. Circuit declined to address whether the disclosure of unclassified 
CFIUS evidence is covered by executive privilege. Ralls II, 758 F.3d 296, 319–20 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014). 
218 For more information on the FISC, see Kate Poorbaugh, Note, Security Protocol: A 
Procedural Analysis of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1363, 1370–72 (2015). 
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In 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA),219 in order to, amongst other things, provide judicial 
supervision of warrantless wiretaps.220 FISA created the FISC, which 
exclusively authorizes national security-related electronic 
surveillance.221 FISC was intended to provide judicial review of 
electronic surveillance in a way that could protect basic civil liberties 
while also allowing for the kind of flexible executive discretion that is 
necessary in national security decisions.222 
FISC is composed of eleven U.S. district court judges, who are 
appointed by the Chief Justice.223 The government applies to FISC for 
electronic surveillance warrants, which a FISC judge reviews in 
highly-secure hearings.224 If the Attorney General signs a sworn 
affidavit stating that an adversarial hearing would harm U.S. national 
security, this hearing is conducted in camera and ex parte.225 Under the 
standards laid out in FISA, a FISC judge determines whether electronic 
surveillance is justified.226 Any appeals from the denial of a warrant go 
to a three-judge panel of federal appellate judges, also designated by 
the Chief Justice.227 
Pursuant to Congressional action, a CFIUS court could easily be 
modeled after the FISC. First, the Chief Justice could appoint a pool of 
federal judges who are experts in national security law to the CFIUS 
court, much like FISC. If CFIUS chose to initiate an independent 
review, both the Committee and the affected company could submit 
their initial briefing and evidence—including the government’s 
classified intelligence evidence—to the CFIUS court. The court could 
then review the relevant evidence and conduct a fact-specific 
procedural due process analysis based on the parties’ filings. After 
determining the size of the of the CFIUS applicant’s property interest, 
as well as the magnitude of any national security threats posed by the 
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application, the CFIUS court could tailor a hearing that would properly 
balance these two interests. For example, the CFIUS court could turn 
over classified pieces of evidence to the applicant if the applicant’s 
interest in reviewing that evidence exceeded the government’s national 
security reason for keeping it secret. The CFIUS court could also devise 
a hearing for the two parties, and then decide whether to uphold or 
reverse CFIUS’s recommendation that the President veto a particular 
transaction. 
Creating a special Article III CFIUS court would preserve 
presidential war powers and still allow for executive discretion in 
matters of national security. Because the court would evaluate the 
specific national security threat posed by a transaction, the executive 
branch would not be pigeonholed into providing blanket procedural 
protections across the board. Instead, CFIUS would retain the 
flexibility to adjust its review process based on the magnitude of a 
particular threat. Although the CFIUS court would conduct an 
independent analysis of a national security threat, this analysis would 
be largely deferential to the executive branch. Moreover, the CFIUS 
court could protect vulnerable U.S. strategic assets. By highly 
scrutinizing a company’s application materials, the court could deter 
adversarial shell companies from applying and could smoke out 
illegitimate enterprises. Finally, by carefully screening government 
evidence before turning it over to the other side, the CFIUS court could 
prevent the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information. 
Additionally, to the extent that CFIUS is plagued with opacity, a 
special court would depoliticize the CFIUS process and restore 
transparency to national security reviews. Independent judicial 
supervision would make CFIUS review more predictable, thus 
decreasing the uncertainty that can surround foreign investments. By 
taking the CFIUS review process out of the sole purview of the 
executive branch, a special court could also help the Committee avoid 
the political theater of decisions like DP World. Furthermore, by 
tailoring a fact-specific hearing, the CFIUS court could ensure that 
applicants receive meaningful due process and access to all relevant, 
non-sensitive evidence. Each of these steps would improve investors’ 
perception of CFIUS by making the Committee more accountable. 
A CFIUS court, modeled after the FISC, is the best hope to balance 
foreign-owned property interests with U.S. national security. As the 
Ralls saga illustrates, the CFIUS system is currently in a state of 
judicial limbo, which tarnishes the investment credibility of the United 
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States while also subjecting American strategic assets to serious risks. 
Although further exploration is needed, an independent Article III 
court could provide parties with the judicial review and constitutional 
protections they need, without sacrificing national security. 
CONCLUSION 
Globalization has made international markets increasingly 
interdependent, but it has also made potential security threats more 
diffuse, proximate, and clandestine. As foreign capital pours into U.S. 
assets, there are more opportunities than ever for American adversaries 
to infiltrate the nation’s critical infrastructure and spy on its military 
capabilities. In this context, CFIUS’s role in identifying national 
security threats in foreign transactions has taken on a heightened 
importance. From port terminals in New York City to green energy 
development in rural Oregon, the federal government must assess 
international mergers and acquisitions for risk. But, as the Ralls Corp.’s 
attempted purchase of four wind farms demonstrates, the complexities 
of international trade can pit the protections of the U.S. Constitution 
against the executive branch’s national security prerogatives. 
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Ralls II, however, fails to adequately 
address this core conflict. By creating minimum due process standards 
for CFIUS review without reference to specific threats, the Ralls II 
decision intrudes on presidential authority, yet in a way that makes 
additional CFIUS transparency improbable. Rather than allow the 
judiciary to erode executive discretion and reflexively lurch from one 
decision to the next, Congress should create a special court of national 
security judges to review foreign transactions. This court would 
impartially supervise executive national security assessments in a way 
that affords due process to affected parties. In attempting to balance the 
fundamental tension between liberty and security, a special CFIUS 
court is the best way to bring certainty and equilibrium to foreign 
transactions. 
 
